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THE REMOTE PURCHASER OF MADE-TO-ORDER
GOODS: THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY IN
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
In products liability cases, remote purchasers have traditionally
been denied recovery for lost profits.' One type of commercial transaction, however, warrants special treatment: the purchase of made-toorder goods through a jobber. The purchaser of these goods can be
compensated under traditional third-party beneficiary principles without opening the floodgates to recovery for consequential losses in all
circumstances.
The principal concern in allowing any remote purchaser redress
against the manufacturer is protection of the former's justifiable reliance on the capacity of the defective product. But an important
factor which must be weighed against the purchaser's reliance is the
prospect of subjecting the manufacturer to unpredictable liability.2
Where the manufacturer has expressly warranted to the public that
his product will adequately perform certain functions, he has apparently calculated the scope of his liability; the courts are generally
not reluctant to compensate even for profit loss from the use of such
an expressly warranted product.3 In the absence of any express warran1 This loss is generally included with property damage and direct pecuniary loss
under the heading "economic loss." Recovery for "economic loss" in products liability
cases has been the source of much confusion and apparent conflict. See Note, Economic
Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLum. L. REv. 917, 943 (1966) for an
analysis of the issues involved in recovery of "economic loss."
2 Because the manufacturer normally lacks knowledge of the specific use to which
his goods will be put, the nature and extent of profit loss is often unpredictable.
See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 16-17, 403 P.2d 145, 150-51, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17, 22-23 (1965); Goldberg v. KolIsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 436-37,
191 N.E.2d 81, 82-83, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 594-95 (1963). See also REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
ToRTs § 402A(2)(b) (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
3 Two of the most significant cases in the area of modem products liability law,
Randy Knitwear v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d
363 (1962) and Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1965), found manufacturers liable for lost profits on the basis of express representations.
How far the California court went in awarding profit loss damages for breach of express
warranties in Seely is not completely clear. At one point the court noted that profit loss
liability accrued because the "warrantor repeatedly failed to correct the defect as
promised." Id. at 14, 403 P.2d at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20. The court went on to
maintain that damages awarded should be the loss directly and naturally resulting in
the ordinary course of events from the breach of warranty. Id. at 14, 403 P.2d at 148, 45
Cal. Rptr. at 20. There the breach of 'warranty" as set out in the purchase order was in
the truck's failure "to be free from defects in material and workmanship" as expressly
promised. Yet incidental damages were awarded because the manufacturer failed to
comply with its own contractual limitation of remedy by failing to repair. See UCC § 2-719.
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ties, however, there seem to be no cases awarding damages for profit
loss due to defects in products marketed through intermediaries to
the public at large. 4 Usually, the purchaser in such a case has anonymously acquired a good in the public market and relied on its effective
operation in a manner totally unforeseeable to the manufacturer. Reliance on the manufacturer's skill and knowledge is not, therefore, justifiable in this context. Moreover, where the manufacturer is unaware
of the specific use to which his product will be put, unpredictability
renders the remote purchaser and his proximate vendor better able
to insure against defects, a reversal of the normal relationship. 5
These considerations are probably inapposite when a jobber
merely passes along a made-to-order product. Concededly, there may
be cases where any reliance by the remote purchaser was solely on the
jobber. If the manufacturer can demonstrate lack of contact with, or
ignorance of, the remote purchaser for whom the goods are specifically
produced, the made-to-order purchaser should be treated the same as
the purchaser at large in a normal distributive chain. In the ordinary
case, however, a purchaser buying through a jobber relies on both the
jobber and the manufacturer. The remote purchaser may even specify
the particular manufacturer from whom the jobber is to acquire the
made-to-order goods. 6 Although privity of contract is lacking between
the remote purchaser and the manufacturer, the parties may have sub7
stantial contact in regard to specifications of the made-to-order product.

In the context of such manufacturer-purchaser contact, any reliance by
the purchaser is fair. The manufacturer should be adequately aware
of the profit loss the remote purchaser will suffer if the made-to-order
product proves defective.
Thus, under Seely, the Code's "Contractual Modification or Limitation of Remedy" was
construed to expand, rather than limit, liability. In Seely, the attempt to limit liability
to the expense of making good defective parts backfired, creating an additional express
warranty, the breach of which left the manufacturer liable for direct and consequential
losses. See UCC §§ 2-714, -715.
4 But see Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 435, 191 N.E.2d 81,
82, 24 N.Y.S.2d 592, 594 (1963), where Chief Judge Desmond stated, "The Randy Knitwear
opinion at least suggested that all requirements of privity have been dispensed with in
our State."
5 Note, supra note 1, at 964-66.
6 Cf. UCC § 2-315, Comment 5; UNIFORM SALES Aar § 15(4).
7 E.g., Rhodes Pharmacal v. Continental Can Co., 72 Ill. App. 2d 362, 119 N.E.2d 726
(1966). See Ruud, Manufacturers Liability for Representations Made by Their Sales
Engineers to Subpurchasers, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 251, 278-80 (1961), where the author supports the contention that in the circumstances where a product is procured through a

jobber, substantial contact is likely between the remote purchaser and the manufacturer
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Focusing on the jobber, the made-to-order purchaser's need for
direct recourse against the manufacturer becomes more evident. If the
jobber's principal asset is merely his personal ability to render a service
of product distribution, his enterprise may not involve sufficient capital
to cover losses caused by the distributed products-he may be judgment proof. Furthermore, if the purchaser of made-to-order goods is
not forced to sue the intermediary, the time and expense of an additional law suit for indemnification is saved.8 Direct suits against manufacturers of made-to-order goods can be effectively implemented by
the application of existing third-party beneficiary law.
In a recent Illinois case, Rhodes Pharmacal v. Continental Can
Co.,9 plaintiff, a hair and beauty products dealer, sued the manufacturer of the defective containers in which he packaged his product
for four hundred thousand dollars lost profits and other damages.
Although there were no express representations to Rhodes and no
privity, defendant knew the nature of its product's intended use and
the likely damages that would be incurred should it not perform as
expected. Basing its decision on plaintiff's reliance on the skill and
judgment of the manufacturer and Continental's knowledge of plaintiff's intended use, the court awarded the lost profits. The court held
that because defendant's implied warranties of fitness and merchantability were intended for plaintiff's benefit "Plaintiff has a direct
cause of action against Continental as the third-party beneficiary of the
agreement for the sale of cans by Continental to [the intermediate
seller] . .

.,0

or his agent. In analyzing the liability of the manufacturer to the remote purchaser for
representations of his sales engineer-agent, the author explains:
He [the manufacturer's agent] may provide technical information and advice
directly to an industrial purchaser to induce the latter to use the product in a
situation in which the product will actually be marketed to the purchaser through
a distributor or other independent sales intermediary ....

Id. at 253.
8 See, eg., Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 87, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1966),
where tomato growers sued immediate seed supplier, the immediate supplier got a judgment against the intermediate supplier, the intermediate supplier against the seed broker,
and the seed broker against the seed producer. The appellate court in its synopsis of
conclusions stated:
We hold that the trial court correctly awarded successive judgments under the
facts found because of the breach by each seed supplier (including Asgrow) of
successive warranties, both express and implied, but we conclude that the trial
court incorrectly held that nonprivity relieved Asgrow of direct liability. We hold
its liability, regardless of absence of privity, was direct and primary.
Id. at 90, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 611-12.
9 72 III. App. 2d 362, 219 N.E.2d 726 (1966).
10 Id. at 367, 219 N.E2d at 730. See also Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio
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*This application of third-party beneficiary doctrine. to. the_ purchases of made-to-order goods does not substantially differ from its
traditional use. In the landmark New York case of Lawrence v. Fox,"
Holly, a third party, loaned three hundred dollars to the defendant in
exchange for a promise that the defendant would repay the three hundred dollars to the plaintiff. The promise was exacted to satisfy a prior
debt owed by Holly to the plaintiff. In light of Holly's prior debt to
the plaintiff, the court permitted plaintiff to enforce defendant's
promise. The initial contract obligation of the jobber to the remote
purchaser of made-to-order goods is analogous to Holly's prior debt to
the plaintiff, third-party beneficiary. Similarly, the manufacturer's promise to the jobber to supply a commodity to meet the needs and specifications of a specific remote purchaser parallels Fox's promise to pay
12
Holly's creditor.
Three distinctions might be made between the classic third-party
beneficiary case and that of the jobber: (1) Delivery would not necessarily be directly to the purchaser; (2) the jobber-manufacturer contract may not name the remote purchaser; and (3) the jobber deals
with promised commodities, not cash. The proposed Restatement of
Contracts (Second) indicates that these distinctions are not control13
ling.
App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928); 2 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTs § 378 A at 969, 976 (3d ed. 1959).
A similar result could possibly be reached under two other theories. First, because the
jobber, under the Rhodes facts, is more of a matchmaker or conduit than a party, warranties given to him could be constructively given to the actual purchaser. Alternatively,
some theory of special agency for the purpose of procuring a certain product would support extension of the warranties to the purchaser.
11 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
12 See Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. R.v. 119 (1958). After discussing Lawrence v. Fox in demonstrating that contracts may create obligations to those
not in privity, Professor Gillam notes:
If a debtor's promise to a creditor to pay the creditor's creditor can be enforced by the latter, it may be argued persuasively that the contractual obligation of a manufacturer to a retailer to supply goods suitable for resale to
consumers should be enforceable by the retailer's customers.
Id. at 138.
13 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACS § 133 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1968). The proposed revision of the Restatement abandons the terminology of "creditor" and "donee"
beneficiary in an attempt to more dearly delineate a third party with rights under a
contract as an intended beneficiary:
§ 133. INTENDED AND INCIDENTAL BENEFICIARIES.
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary
of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of
the parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the
promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or
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Concerning the delivery distinction, the Restatement maintains
that where the intent of the parties is to benefit a third person, and the
obligation exists from promisee to beneficiary, direct action by the
beneficiary is appropriate "even though no intention is manifested
[as in specifying delivery] to give the beneficiary the benefit ....- 14
In regard to the contract's failure to mention the intended beneficiary, the Restatement says:
It is not essential to the creation of a right in an intended
beneficiary that he be identified [in the contract] when a contract
containing the promise is made. 15
In making this same point Williston adds, "'[F]acts and circumstances surrounding the transaction [must] show clearly that a particular person (though not named) is the beneficiary.' "16 Thus, although
the beneficiary must be identified before he can enforce the contract,
it is not necessary that he be named therein. 17 Finally, the Restatement recognizes a "[p]romise of a performance other than the payment
of money" where it manifests an intention to give a third party the
benefit of the promised performance.1 8
Intent to benefit has thus become the guideline for establishing
the rights of third-party beneficiaries. Although it may appear naive
to imagine that a manufacturer or intermediate distributor enters
sales contracts with intent to benefit anyone but himself, as Corbin
noted, "[t]he question is not 'whose interest and benefit are primarily
subserved,' but what was the performance contracted for and what is
the best way to bring it about."'19
(b) the promise manifests an intention to give the beneficiary the
benefit of the promised performance.
Comment b to § 133 suggests the applicability of this section to the jobber context:
In such cases the promisee is surety for the promisor, the promise is an asset of
the promisee, and a direct action by beneficiary against promisor is normally
appropriate to carry out the intention of the promisor and promisee, even though
no intention is manifested to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised
performance. Promise of a performance other than the payment of money may
be governed by the same principle if the promisee's obligation is regarded as
easily converted into money, as in the cases of obligations to deliver commodities
or securities which are actively traded in organized markets. Less liquid obligations are left to Subsection (1)(b). (Emphasis added.)
14 Id. § 133, comment b.
15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1967). The original
Restatement § 139 has the same provision in reference to "donee" and "creditor" beneficiaries.
16 2 WLuMSTON, supra note 10, § 378, at 1954-56 quoting Marlboro Shirt Co. v.
American District Tele. Co., 196 Md. 565, 77 A.2d 776 (1950) (parenthetical is Williston's).
17 4 A. CORBIN, CONRACrS § 781, at 70 (1951).
18 RESTATEM NT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTs § 133, comment b (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1968).
19 4 CO.BIN, supra note 17, § 776. See also R.STATEMENT (SEcOND) oF CONTRACTS § 133,
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PROPOSED APPLICATION OF THIRD-PARTY BENEFICARY
AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the remote purchaser of
a made-to-order product who seeks compensation for profit loss would
premise his suit on the implied warranties of merchantibility20 and fitness2 ' in the contract between the manufacturer and the jobber. By
the nature of a contract for a made-to-order product, there likely will
be an express warranty to the extent of the specifications described in
the jobber-manufacturer contract. Should the product not conform to
such specifications, the express warranty by description would be
breached. 22 It is more difficult when the made-to-order product, notwithstanding its conformity to the contract description, is defective.
Under the Code, "merchantability" and "fitness" warranties thus become relevant. Application of third-party beneficiary doctrine in this
context would comport with the Code to the extent that the Code
addresses the issue of liability to remote purchasers. 23 Although section
2-318, concerning third-party beneficiaries and warranties, expressly
refers only to personal injuries to members or guests of family or household,24 the comments declare that,
the Section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the
developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to
Illustration 5 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1968). Commentators have previously taken the position that third-party beneficiary rights should encourage effective implementation of the
performance contracted for, e.g., Note, The Third Party Beneficiary Concept: A Proposal,
57 COLUm. L. REv. 406, 428 (1957); Note, 31 TExAs L. REv. 210 (1952).
20 UCC § 2-314.
21 Id. § 2-315. See also Donovan, Recent Developments in Products Liability Litigation in New England: The Emerging Confrontation Between the Expanding Law of
Torts and the Uniform Commercial Code, 19 MAINE L. Rxv. 181, 198 (1967).
22 This reliance on merchantability and fitness warranties presumes no express
warranties arising from the manufacturer's express promises concerning the product's
capacities. UCC § 2-313(a). Where the express warranty is of this type, liability to the
remote purchaser is more easily established in current case law. See note 3 supra and
accompanying text.
23 The drafters' comment states: "IT]he warranty sections of [article 2] are not
designed in any way to disturb those lines of case law growth which have recognized that
warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to the direct parties to such
a contract." UCC § 2-313, Comment 2.
Although the fitness warranty is couched in terms of "buyer" and "seller" while the
merchantability warranty refers only to "seller," both implied warranties seem, equally
applicable to the third-party beneficiary in the made-to-order goods context. The comment suggesting that warranty liability may extend beyond parties to the sales' contract
refers to "warranty sections" of Article 2 of the Code.
24 UCC § 2-318.
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his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive
25
chain.
Where the Code leaves products liability to the evolving body of
case law, it purports to supply "useful guidance in dealing with
further cases as they arise." 26 Particularly relevant in this regard is the
section on implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose. 27 Since
the vendor's liability increases with knowledge of the particular purpose to which a good will be put,28 the Code arguably would support a
distinction between the remote purchaser at large and the remote
purchaser of made-to-order goods. The seller's knowledge of reliance
on his "skill or judgment to furnish suitable goods" is the determinative element. Finally, lost profits are not referred to in the Code's
section on damages for breach of warranty.2 9 In "special circumstances,"
31
however, different proximate damages" and incidental expenses
(which may include any other reasonable expense incident to the
breach) 32 may be recovered.
PROTECTION

FOR THE MANUFACTURER

Use of the common law doctrine of third-party beneficiary would
not leave the manufacturer at the mercy of remote purchasers of made25 Id. Comment 3. The scope of § 2-318 has long been the subject of debate. Currently, according to its text, it stands as a limited extension of horizontal non-privity in
personal injury cases. A much broader third-party beneficiary section in the 1949 draft of
the Code was rejected. It would have extended the scope of horizontal non-privity and

applied to injury to person or property.
The 1966 official recommendations for amendments of the Code included a proposal
that the states choose one of three forms of § 2-318. PERMANENT EDrrORiAL BOARD FOR
CODE, REPORT No. 3, at 13 (1967). Alternative A is the present
THE UNIFORM Co ,mctrAL

§ 2-318. Alternative B is similar to the 1949 proposal but suggests applicability to vertical
as well as horizontal non-privity by substituting the words "person who may reasonably
be expected to use" for the 1949 language "person whose relation to the buyer is such

as to make it reasonable to expect that such person may use." Alternative B also is
distinguishable from the 1949 proposal, in that its scope is limited to personal injury.
Alternative C reads like B but would include any injury as opposed to only personal
injury.

One commentator would broaden the third-party beneficiary section of the Code to
eliminate the evolving overlap between the Code and tort law. Weaver, Allocation of
Risk in ProductsLiability Cases: The Need for a Revised Third Party Beneficiary Theory
in UCC Warranty Actions, 52 VA. L. REv. 1028, 1059-60, 1066-67 (1966).
26 UCC § 2-313, Comment 2.

27 Id. § 2-315.
28 Compare id. §§ 2-315 & 2-314.
29 Id. § 2-714(2).
30 Id.

31 Id. § 2-714(3).
82 Id. § 2-715(1).
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to-order goods. Conceivably, the manufacturer could disclaim liability
for defects in his made-to-order products.3 3 In practice, however, it is
unlikely that an intermediate jobber would accept a contract with
such a disclaimer.34 Were he to do so, the jobber might be left without
recourse against the manufacturer for rejected unfit or unmerchantable
goods or for damages recovered by his aggrieved buyer. Furthermore,
a disclaimer would encourage the remote purchaser to sue the jobber
rather than the manufacturer. If the jobber and the remote purchaser
were to assent to a valid disclaimer36 in the process of bargaining for
their respective contracts, it would seem reasonable to give force to
such disclaimers. 36
Alternatively, the manufacturer's interests are protected to the
extent that the remote purchaser only acquires rights from the contract between the jobber and the manufacturer where the performance
contracted for demonstrates the requisite intent to benefit. The manufacturer can dearly establish in the jobber contract that there is no
intent to benefit parties not in privity to the immediate transaction.31
In a recent Second Circuit case, Hylte Bruks Aktiebolag & Nymolla v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,38 plaintiff sued for .836,000 lost profits
caused by the defective operation of custom-made machinery. Plaintiff
attempted to establish itself as the third-party beneficiary of the sales
contract between the manufacturer and plaintiff's parent corporation.
The court held that plaintiff had no right to enforce its parent's
contract because it failed to make out the necessary intent to benefit;
in its contract with the intermediate, defendant manufacturer had
33 Id. § 2-316.
34 In a recent article, in which the author contends that the Code should effectively
occupy the field of products liability cases, it is maintained that the availability of seller
disclaimers would not render the aggrieved remote purchaser helpless. Manufacturers
exhibit no widespread desire to draw public attention to potential dangers in their
products. Also, "[t]he disclaimer has generally not been held to bar anyone other than
the actual contract buyer, and the trend will certainly be against expanding disclaimer
disabilities." Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in
Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974, 1011 (1966).
35 But ef. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 whereby in the discretion of a court a
clause or whole contract can be rendered unenforceable on grounds of unconscionability.
36 A difficult question arises where the jobber has accepted a disclaimer in his contract with the manufacturer and omitted the same in his contract with the remote purchaser. The purchaser is injured thereby only if the jobber is judgment proof. Otherwise,
the jobber's interest dictates elimination of disclaimers.
37 The Restatement provision for third-party beneficiary rights begins: "Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee .RSrATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAsrs
§ 188 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1968).
38 899 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1968).
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specifically asserted its desire not to be a party to any further agreement which would create liability to third parties.
The question thus arises, what would prevent the manufacturer
from simply boiler-plating the jobber contract with a clause to undermine the rights of a remote purchaser of made-to-order goods seeking
third-party beneficiary status. Again the relative bargaining power of
the jobber in protecting not only the remote purchaser's but ultimately
his own interest would serve to prohibit wholesale contractual avoidance of responsibility.
Where parties manifest intent to limit the scope of their transaction, obligations beyond such intention should not be judicially imposed: the Hylte Bruks decision is a sensible one. Yet the Second
Circuit's reasoning in Hylte Bruks is in no way incompatible with that
of the Rhodes court. Normally when a remote purchaser is the intended beneficiary of a sale of a made-to-order product to a jobber, foreseeable reliance on responsible performance by the manufacturer should
not go unprotected.
A. Bruce Campbell

